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ABSTRACT: 
Wild Atlantic salmon are traditionally harvested from both the sea and spawning rivers during 
spawning runs. From an economic point of view, the return from sport fishing in rivers is 
several times higher than marine ‘for meat only’ harvests. This situation calls for a side 
payment regime where river owners pay marine fishermen not to fish, and where both parties 
gain. This paper argues that the reason why such side payment regimes are rarely seen, 
despite the obvious mutual gain, is due to the potential free-riding incentives among river 
owners. Although it is shown that the decision each river owner faces can be described as a 
game of chicken, taking the stochastic ecology into account may reveal a different pay-off 
structure. It is also demonstrated that the stochastic ecology of salmon, combined with price 
rigidities in the rivers, may explain the lack of side payment regimes.  
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Introduction 
Here, we analyse the case where wild Atlantic salmon stock is harvested by both recreational 
anglers and commercial fishermen. Many studies have argued that the share of the total 
harvest caught in the recreational sector should typically increase because the value of the fish 
in this sector is greater than that in commercial fisheries (for example, see Cook and McGaw 
1996, Laukkanen 2001, and Olaussen and Skonhoft 2005). However, when at least one party 
has property rights, agents left to their own devices should be able to allocate resources 
according to the well-known ‘Coase Theorem’. Few examples of such arrangements are seen 
in the real world though, and criticism of the reality of Coasian mechanisms is widely 
recognized. Even so, some examples exist, e.g., the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty of 1911, 
where the shared resource was nationalized to remove incentives to overexploit the fur seal, 
and where countries that lost their right to harvest were compensated (Wilen 1969). Another 
example stems from wild Atlantic salmon fisheries: initiated by the North Atlantic Salmon 
Fund, Faeroe Islands fishermen have been compensated for ‘not fishing’ their quota of 
Atlantic salmon since 1991.i 
 
Atlantic salmon in Norway are harvested in two ways after they leave their offshore habitats 
and start their spawning runs.ii Before they reach their spawning rivers, they are first 
harvested by commercial fishermen in the fjords and inlets. During their upstream runs and 
stays in the rivers, they are next harvested by recreational anglers. Since it is clearly evident 
that the recreational sector is far more valuable than marine fisheries (Skonhoft and Logstein 
2003), and that marine and river fishing rights follow the property rights of coastal and 
riparian lands, respectively, the situation calls for a bargain. One likely result is a closure of 
the commercial fishery financed by side payments from river owners. 
 
In Norway, with more than 500 salmon rivers, only one such side payment agreement exists. 
It was initiated during the 2005 fishing season in the Trondheim fjord, in the middle of 
Norway. In this paper, we analyse the side payment-type agreement by focusing on the 
decision process facing river owners. The lack of side payment agreements thus far may be 
explained by incentives among river owners to act strategically. Since it is not possible to 
separate salmon with different home rivers before they enter a specific river, a river owner 
who pays marine fishermen not to fish also increases the fish stock in nearby rivers. Hence, 
each river owner has an incentive to ‘free ride’ on other river owners. Moreover, the 
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stochastic ecology of Atlantic salmon makes a side payment less appealing because the 
contract is signed before actual stock levels are observed in the rivers. We show that these 
types of contracts, combined with rigid fishing license prices in the rivers, may explain why 
river owners seem to be reluctant to enter such arrangements.  
 
Several studies have been concerned with the management of natural resources under 
conditions of uncertainty (see Nøstbakken 2005 for a recent overview). Reed (1979) 
developed a model where a stochastic ecological process due to multiplicative independent 
identically distributed environmental shocks takes place between the previous period’s 
escapement and the current period’s recruitment. Reed explored a situation where the 
manager chooses the harvest level after the uncertainty has been resolved; that is, after the 
actual current stock is observed. He demonstrated that in this setting, the optimal harvest 
policy is a bang-bang constant escapement rule. However, Clark and Kirkwood (1986) 
demonstrated that the constant escapement policy is no longer optimal if the manager chooses 
the harvest policy before the uncertainty is revealed. Weitzman (2002) analysed whether fees 
are better than quotas in the presence of stock uncertainty. In Weitzman’s paper, the regulator 
chooses a landing fee or harvest quota before the state of the environment can be observed, 
while fishermen choose their fishing efforts after they observe both the management 
instrument and fish stock. Weitzman demonstrated that in such a situation, fees are always 
better than catch quotas under stock uncertainty. The key mechanism is that under stock 
uncertainty, it is better to control the effort undertaken by the fishermen than to try to directly 
control the number of fish they harvest.  
 
McKelvey (1997) introduced game theory into a sequential interception fishery where the 
underlying stock uncertainty is included in the model with a stochastic pay-off function. 
Laukkanen (2003) built stock uncertainty into Hannesson’s (1995) model with cooperative 
harvesting as a self-enforcing equilibrium supported by the threat of harvesting non-
cooperatively forever if deviations are detected. Laukkanen argued that when including 
stochastic ecology into Hannesson’s model, the agent who harvests the initial stock cannot 
infer if the other harvesting agent defected or not. Therefore, she defines conditions under 
which cooperative harvesting can be sustained as a self-enforcing equilibrium, even if the 
actions of one harvester are not observable owing to environmental shocks.  
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In this paper, river owners do not know current stock levels when they decide on their 
controls due to stochastic survival. Similar to Weitzman (2002), the control applied by the 
owners is fees (fishing permits) and not quotas, and the permit prices are set before nature 
reveals the survival. As opposed to the games in McKelvey (1997) and Laukkanen (2003), the 
interaction between the two management authorities (river owners) is not by harvesting the 
same fish stock, but through side payments to a third (marine) harvesting agent. Such agents 
harvest a fraction of both fish stocks before they enter the fishing zones controlled by the 
respective river authorities. Therefore, the game is one of side payments (acquisition of 
marine fishing rights). Equilibrium levels in mixed strategies are used as indicators of the 
likelihood that each manager cooperates (acquisition of marine fishing rights) or defects (no 
acquisition). The influence of stochastic survival of recruits on the mixed strategy equilibrium 
levels is analysed under two different price setting regimes in the rivers: rigid and flexible 
fishing permit prices. Rigid permit prices are in accordance with present price setting regimes 
in most salmon rivers because the permit prices are announced in the winter, long before the 
stock is observed (in summer) and the fishing season opens. Since this rigid price setting lacks 
motivation in any formal requirements, but rather seems to reflect some traditional practice, 
we want to analyse an alternative price setting regime that takes the stochastic ecology of 
salmon into account. Flexible permit prices mean that the permit price is set at the beginning 
of the fishing season, after the stock size can be determined.iii We demonstrate that when 
ecology is stochastic, rigid and flexible prices may shift the equilibrium mixed strategy levels 
in opposite directions. To our knowledge, this is the first application of strategic interactions 
on the management of recreational resources.  
 
Side payments: the case of the Trondheim fjord Atlantic salmon fishery 
Atlantic salmon stock spawn in their home river: that is, the river where the stock hatched and 
spent its presmolt (juvenile) period (approximately three years). After one or more winters in 
an offshore habitat, the stock returns to its home river to spawn. On this spawning run, the 
salmon is typically harvested in two sequential ways. As shown in Figure 1, the salmon is first 
harvested by marine fisheries in the fjords and inlets (see also Figure 1). The escapement from 
these fisheries reaches the spawning rivers and is harvested by recreational anglers. The 
remaining stock in the river after the fishing season closes spawns in the late autumn.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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In the Trondheim fjord, there are many salmon rivers, many river owners, and many marine 
fishermen. However, the various river owners are usually members of a river-specific 
organization called the elveeier-lag (river owner cooperation), where various management 
decisions are made by majority.iv Marine fishermen are organized into a similar cooperation 
called Sør-Trøndelag Grunneiagar-og Sjøfiskarlag. In late 2004, an organization called 
Elvene rundt Trondheimsfjorden (Trondheim fjord rivers), hereafter labelled ErT, was 
established. ErT is a non-profit organization established with the claimed goal of increasing 
the wild salmon stock in rivers (ErT 2005). The fact that there is no formal connection 
between ErT and the river owners is crucial for the strategic interactions between river 
owners. ErT negotiates with the marine fishermen in order to reach an agreement on 
acquisition of the marine harvest with respect to both quantity and price. More specifically, 
they agree on the price per kilo of salmon that the marine fishermen require for not fishing. 
Each marine fisherman is compensated based of his average yearly catch statistics over the 
last five fishing seasons. In addition, ErT stated that it would call off the deal unless at least 
80% of the marine harvest comprised the contract (ErT 2005). Note that we neglect the 
potential game in price negotiations between ErT and marine fisheries throughout the paper. 
Since the marine fishermen achieve a substantially higher net price per kilo of salmon when 
they do not fish than when they do, it is evident that the price is pushed by the marine sector 
in a way that makes the marine fishermen better off. However, sharing rules are beyond the 
scope of this paper, which focuses on the non-cooperative game between different river 
owners. Hence, the outcome of negotiations between ErT and the marine fishermen is not 
taken into consideration.v  
 
The agreement first took effect in the 2005 fishing season. The contract between ErT and the 
marine fishermen was signed with the intention to last for five years with a possible 
extension. However, since there are no binding contracts between ErT and the river owners, 
the financial foundation is somewhat loose. The various river owners intend to pay the marine 
fishermen through ErT after the fishing season in the river closes. Since they do not know 
beforehand how many owners will contribute, their own share of the costs is directly 
dependent on the decisions of other river owners. This financial question must be solved each 
year by ErT. As such, the decision to pay the marine fishermen has to be taken every year, 
dependent on the river owners (rivers) commitment to finance the agreement before each 
fishing season. Hence, if the agreed acquisition level is not financed before any given season, 
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ErT, a non-profit organization with no financial power of its own, will be obliged to call off 
the agreement. 
 
As indicated in Figure 1 and in the Introduction, it is not possible to separate salmon stocks 
from different rivers before they reach their spawning rivers. Hence, if owners of one river 
decide to pay the marine fishermen to stop fishing, they also increase the salmon stocks in 
other rivers in the fjord. From the river owner’s point of view, it seems evident that each 
owner has an incentive to free ride on other owners; that is, providing the other owners decide 
to finance the acquisitions.  
 
To fix the ideas, we present the management problem facing a river owner i, managing stock i 
in river i, and where other rivers are represented as j ( i j≠ ). ,i tX  is the size of the salmon 
population in river i, measured as biomass, (or number of “normalized salmon”) year t. The 
salmon stock is first harvested by the commercial marine fishery, and the fraction 0 1th≤ ≤  is 
removed from the stock (see Figure 2). The escapement from this fishery, ,(1 )t i th X− , 
constitutes the available stock in the recreational stream fishery. The effort in the river fishery 
is given by number of fishing days, ,i tD , which is the same as the number of fishing permits 
sold by the river owner. We assume that the offtake in the river follows the Schaefer-type 
harvest function. Hence, the total river yield is written as: 
 
                                                    , , ,(1 )i t i t t i tY qD h X= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦                                                      (1) 
 
where ,i tY  is the total offtake and q  is the catchability coefficient. Note that the content in the 
bracket on the right-hand side of equation (1) is the total biomass available in the recreational 
fishery. Moreover we have that the total offtake in river i per definition writes 
 
                                                    , , ,(1 )i t i t t i tY y h X= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .                                                     (2)   
 
Hence, from equation (1) and (2), it follows that the fraction of stock removed due to 
harvesting is , ,i t i ty qD= , and where ,0 1i ty≤ ≤ .vi The escapement from the recreational fishery 
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takes part in the spawning and contribute to the future stock, ,i tX κ+
vii, as given by equation (3) 
(again, see Figure 2).  
 
                                   ( ), , , ,(1 )(1 ) ) ( )i t i t t i t i tX R qD h X R S+κ = − − =                              (3) 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The demand for fishing licenses in the river is increasing in the quality of the fishing 
experience with respect to the stock ,(1 )t i th X−  and decreasing in the fishing permit price ,i tP  
(see Olaussen and Skonhoft (2005)). The river owner acts as a monopolistic supplier of 
fishing permits, restricting the supply in order to raise the profit. The monopolistic assumption 
means that the river owner, who offer fishing permits to the recreational anglers, is able to 
take advantage of the downward slope of the demand curve. The assumption of monopolistic 
behaviour fits with the behaviour of Norwegian river owners in a typical large salmon river. 
The competition from owners in other rivers may vary, and the crucial factor is the distance, 
which may vary between some few kilometres to over two hundred kilometresviii. The cost of 
providing fishing licenses ( ),i tC D includes fixed as well as variable costs and where 
,( ) 0i tC D′ >  and ,( ) 0i tC D′′ ≥ . The fixed cost are various types of costs associated with 
preparing the fishery (constructing and maintenance of tracks, fishing huts, and so forth), 
while the variable costs include the costs of organizing the fishing permit sale and 
enforcement.  
 
The river owner has one additional control available; ,i tA , which is acquisition of fishing 
rights from the commercial fishery, measured in biomass of fish (see below). In the absence 
of strategic interactions with the other river owner, the owner i takes the stock in river j as 
given under the assumption that the river owner j makes no acquisitions ( ,( 0)j tA = . As 
mentioned in the introduction, since it is not possible to separate between salmon with 
different home rivers before they actually enter a specific river, a river owner who pays 
marine fishermen not to fish, also unintentionally increases the fish stock abundance in nearby 
rivers (see Figure 1). The commercial fishing rate decreases with ,i tA  and is now written 
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( )
( ), , ,, , ,
(0)
( ) i t j t i ti t
i t j t
h X X A
h A
X X
+ −= + , and thus, ( ) 0ih A′ <  ( ) 0ih A′′ = , and (0) 0h >  . Hence, per 
definition, ,( ) (0)i th A h=  when , 0i tA = , and ( ), , ,* (0)i t i t j tA h X X= + defines the maximum 
acquisition level since ,( *) 0i th A = . The yearly cost of acquisition, ,( )i tG A , may contain both 
fixed and variable costs with ,( ) 0i tG A′ > , ,( ) 0i tG A′′ ≥ , and (0) 0G ≥ (see the numerical 
specification and results section).  
 
We write the profit function for the river owner i simply as a function of the stock, permits 
and acquisition: ( , , )t t t tX D Aπ = π (omitting subskript i and , 0j tA = ). The stock dynamics is 
written ( , , ) ( )t t t t t t t tX X R X D A X R S X+κ − = − = − .  
 
With the discount factor ( )
1
1
t
tψ = + δ  where δ is the yearly rate of discount, the river owner 
maximises { } ( )1
0
( , , ) ( ( , , ) )
T
t T
t t t t t t t t T
t
L X D A R X D A X J X
− κ
+κ
=
= ψ π + ψ λ − + ψ∑ . J(XT) is the scrap 
value at time T while t κλ +  is the shadow price of the stock at time t κ+ . The river owner thus 
maximises the object function (profit) over the whole planning period 0...t T=  subject to the 
ecological constraint. Note that as the shadow price t κλ +  is interpreted as the value of an 
additional unit of tX κ+  from the perspective of period t κ+ , the shadow price is discounted 
κψ  to be comparable with the object function, ( , , )t t t tX D Aπ = π , that represent a value in 
period t (Conrad and Clark (1987)). In addition, acquisitions are bounded by the 
restriction 0 *t tA A≤ ≤ , while the restriction 0tD ≥  is neglected. When appending the 
constraints to the multipliers 1w  and 2w  the bounded current value Hamiltonian is written (see 
Kamien and Schwartz (1991)) 
 
                             ( )1 2( , , ) ( ( ) ) *t t t t t t t tH X D A R S X w A w A Aκ +κ= π +ψ λ − + + −                            (4)        
 
The Hamiltonian with specific functional forms is presented in the numerical specification 
and results section.  
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As previously mentioned, acquisitions are side payments from river owners to the marine 
fishermen to make them reduce their harvest. Hence, marine harvest activity is a decreasing 
function of the acquisition level. Since the marine harvest must be non-negative, there exists a 
maximum level of acquisitions, *i iA A= , where the marine harvest is zero. On the other hand, 
if the cost of acquisitions is high, the owner decides not to pay the marine fishermen and 
0iA =  corresponds to the marine harvest activity in the absence of acquisitions. Generally, all 
acquisition levels, 0 *i iA A≤ ≤ , are possible outcomes of the maximization problem facing 
the river owner. However, as previously mentioned, ErT demands that at least 80% of the 
marine harvest is covered by the contract. Hence, there exists a lower limit, LA , on the 
possible acquisition level if the owner chooses 0iA >  such that *Li i iA A A≤ ≤ . To make the 
exposition as simple as possible in the rest of the paper, we let *Li iA A= , such that the owner 
chooses between 0iA =  and *i iA A= .ix  We summarize the possible acquisition choices for 
river owner i as: 
 
                                     
* 0
0
i i
i
i
A if A
A
A otherwise
>⎧= ⎨ =⎩
                                    (5) 
 
Deterministic environment, non-cooperative game  
The model is presented with two river owners, 1 and 2, who manage two different rivers, 1 
and 2, in a fully deterministic environment. The owners and rivers are assumed identical with 
respect to all relevant matters. These simplifying assumptions are for expositional tractability 
only; as will be discussed below, the key mechanisms in the model will be the same with 
more owners and rivers. By introducing strategic interactions between the two river owners 
when deciding on the control ( 1,2)iA i = , we show that these interactions result in a pay-off 
structure in accordance with the game of chicken (for example, see Dutta 1999). What is 
essential for the symmetric 2-player chicken game structure to hold is that *i iA A=  is the 
optimal choice for each owner given that the other owner plays 0jA = , j i≠ . Since it is not 
possible to separate salmon with different home rivers before they actually enter a specific 
river, each owner has an incentive to free ride on the other river owner (see Figure 1 above).  
 
As explained in the previous section, the agreement between the marine fishermen and the 
river owners is reached by the negotiating organization called ErT. Before the fishing season, 
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each owner decides if they want ErT to pay the marine fishermen, and ErT divides the costs 
between the owners choosing *i iA A= . In this two-player scenario, ErT decides to pay the 
marine fishermen if at least one of the owners chooses *i iA A= . Hence, each river owner is 
able to bear the full cost of acquisition on his own. We start out by presenting the one-shot 
game followed by an extension to the repeated game.  
 
The sequence of the deterministic one-shot game is as follows: 
 
i) Each river owner i (i=1, 2) simultaneously makes their acquisition decision and 
reports it to ErT ( 0iA =  or *i iA A= ) before the fishing season. 
ii) The fishing permit price decision is determined by each owner’s own acquisition 
decision and accompanying expected stock level.x 
iii) ErT divides the costs of acquisition between the owners playing *i iA A= .  
 
For notational convenience, let ,0Aiπ  denote the pay-off to owner i if he buys fishing rights 
(plays *i iA A= ) and the other owner decides not to buy fishing rights (plays 0jA = ). Let 
,A A
iπ  be the pay-off to owner i if both play *i iA A= . Furthermore, 0,Aiπ  is the pay-off to 
owner i if he plays 0iA =  and the other owner plays *j jA A= . Finally, 0,0iπ  is the pay-off to 
owner i when neither owner buys fishing rights. The game has a chicken-type structure as 
long as 0, , ,0 0,0A A A Ai i i iπ π π π> > > . With this structure, it is easily recognized that there are two 
Nash equilibriums in pure strategies for the game. These are characterized as 
( 1 1 *A A= , 2 0A = ) and ( 1 0A = , 2 2 *A A= ). 
 
We now introduce the well-known notion of mixed strategies. In the game of chicken, as 
under many other pay-off schemes, both players would like to outguess the other. As stated by 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), mixed strategies entail a deliberate decision by a player to 
introduce randomness into his behaviour, just as it is optimal for poker players to randomly 
decide to ‘bluff’. However, as discussed by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), interpretation of 
the motivation for playing mixed strategies is not clear cut. Despite this, in our setting we 
interpret the mixed strategy as an indicator of the incentive for the owners to free ride on each 
other (see below). Hence, if owner 1 is certain that owner 2 will play 2 0A = , then he has no 
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incentive to free ride. On the other hand, if he is certain that owner 2 will choose 2 2 *A A= , 
then he has no incentive not to free ride. The mixed strategies equilibrium characterizes the 
situation in which an owners anticipation about the other owners choice is such that he is 
indifferent between playing 0iA =  or *i iA A= . If both river owners follow a mixed strategy, 
we can show that a mixed strategy set exists for each owner in which they play either 0iA =  
or *i iA A=  with given probabilities. 
 
Let ( *)i Aρ  denote the probability that owner i plays *i iA A= , and that (0)iρ  is the 
probability he plays 0iA =  and where ( *) (0) 1i iAρ ρ+ = . Playing a mixed strategy, it is 
straightforward to show (see Appendix B) that owner 1 plays 1 0A =  when owner 2 plays 
2 2 *A A=  with a probability greater than m, where m is given by: 
 
                                   
,0 0,0
1 1
,0 0,0 0, ,
1 1 1 1
A
A A A Am
π − π= π − π + π − π .                                                 (6) 
 
It follows directly from equation (6) that under the game of chicken, the pay-off structure m 
decreases when ( ) ( )0, , ,0 0,01 1 1 1/A A A Aπ − π π − π  increases. Note that 0, ,1 1A A Aπ − π  is the gain from free-
riding when owner 2 plays 2 2 *A A= , while ,0 0,01 1Aπ − π  is the gain from not free-riding (or loss 
from free-riding) when owner 2 plays 2 0A = . Hence, equation (6) shows that the mixed 
strategy equilibrium level decreases if the gain from free-riding when owner 2 plays 
2 2 *A A=  increases relative to the loss from free-riding when owner 2 plays 2 0A = . Recollect 
that owner 1 plays 1 0A =  when owner 2 plays 2 2 *A A=  with a probability greater than m. 
Hence, when m decreases, owner 1 will free ride (plays 1 0A = ) in cases where the probability 
that owner 2 plays 2 2 *A A=  is lower. Furthermore, if m is zero, owner 1 always plays 
1 0A = .xi In this sense, we interpret the mixed strategy equilibrium level as an indicator of the 
incentive to free ride. Thus, the probability that owner 1 will free ride increases as m  
decreases. In that sense, we interpret the mixed strategy equilibrium level m as an indicator of 
the incentive to free ride. 
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If extended to an infinitely repeated game, and with the owners playing credible punishment 
(trigger) strategies, they may both play *i iA A= . Hence, the overall yearly pay-off is ,2 A Aiπ , 
with a discount factor close enough to one (for example, see Gibbons 1992, Dutta 1995). This 
is analogous to the ‘Folk Theorem’, which states that the cooperative solution of the repeated 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. However, credible threats may 
be difficult to impose in the game of chicken because the punisher gains from deviating from 
their punishment strategy. Thus, it is unlikely to be in the interest of the punisher to punish 
(Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). In addition, if there is any reputation-building, as introduced 
by Kreps and Wilson (1982), then the long-term outcome of the game will certainly coincide 
with the one-shot Nash equilibriums of the game. However, in the short-term, reputation 
manipulation and an initial phase where no owner wants to reveal that they would gain from 
unilateral deviations may occur. Nevertheless, once one of the owners deviate and play 
*i iA A= , their reputation as an 0iA =  player is destroyed, and their opponent may safely 
play 0jA =  forever.xii Hence, in the case of reputation manipulation, any of the Nash 
equilibrium outcomes of the one-shot game, 1 2*, 0A A A= = , and 1 2 20, *A A A= = , is also 
supported as the long-term Nash equilibrium after an initial phase of both playing 0.iA =  
 
Stochastic game 
In this section, we consider the extent in which the game is affected by relaxing the 
deterministic ecology assumption. According to Hvidsten, Fiske, and Johnsen (2004), the 
stochastic ecology involved makes the wild salmon stock in any given year very difficult to 
predict based on the number of recruits in the cohort. When the wild Atlantic salmon survival 
rate is stochastic, we expect owners to be less willing to buy fishing rights from the marine 
harvesters. With random survival, the economic consequences of a bad year (low survival) are 
shared between the owners and the marine fishermen as they both face a risk of low salmon 
survival. If the owners buy the marine fishing rights, they pay (or commit to pay) a fixed sum 
to the marine fishermen not to fish before the survival is observed. This means that the 
outcome in the marine fisheries no longer depends on random survival, but rather yields a 
deterministic profit to the marine fishermen. On the other hand, the river owners suddenly 
undertake the whole risk due to the uncertainty they used to share with the marine fishermen. 
Therefore, this suggests that owners face greater uncertainty with respect to pay-offs if they 
buy the marine fishing rights. Consequently, assuming risk-neutral or averse river owners, we 
expect the owners to be less eager to buy fishing rights in a stochastic environment than in the 
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deterministic environment analysed earlier. As it turns out, we note that this belief is correct 
only under certain assumptions, and that the crucial factor is how license price determination 
in the river takes place. 
 
As described above, the contract between river owners and marine fishermen is signed via 
ErT before the fishing season opens. The acquisition price per kilo of salmon, as well as the 
total quantity, is determined. The quantity decision is based on the average marine harvest 
reported in historical catch data over the five previous seasons. Since this is based on average 
catches, the river owners commit themselves to a binding contract where their only 
adjustment due to the stochastic ecology after the acquisition decision is made is through the 
fishing permit sale. That is, the acquisition payment represents a sunk cost once the contract is 
signed. In the deterministic world, the river owners know the spawning stock for certain, and 
hence could set the license price based on the actual stock size. As discussed, we address two 
different price setting regimes in the recreational fishing sector: i) rigid (sticky) permit prices; 
and ii) flexible permit prices.  
 
i) Rigid permit prices (rp): The owner decides on whether to buy fishing rights, as 
well as the cost of the fishing licenses, before the stochastic move by nature is 
observed.xiii Rigid permit prices are in accordance with the present price setting 
regimes in most salmon rivers because permit prices are announced in the winter, 
long before the stock is observed (in summer) and the fishing season opens.  
ii) Flexible permit prices (fp): Flexible permit price setting means that the river owner 
is able to adjust the price at the beginning of the fishing season.  
 
In the absence of strategic interactions, flexible permit price setting is, in principle, exactly the 
same as rigid permit prices in the deterministic case. However, flexible permit prices differ 
from the deterministic rigid price setting in that a free-riding river owner is able to adjust the 
permit price, not only because of stochastic ecology, but also because of the choice of 
acquisition by the other river managers. Thus, it is the actual stock size and not acquisitions or 
favourable ecological conditions that determine the permit price decision. Hence, in order to 
compare the stochastic and deterministic case, flexible prices will also need to be considered 
in the deterministic case.  
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Let the random component affecting survival at stage t be statistically independent, uniformly 
distributed, and denoted tz . The mean value is equal to 1, ( ) 1tE z = . Hence, expected survival 
is equal to the deterministic survival rate (see section below for more details). The 
interpretation of a given tz  is that it expresses the random component in the survival from 
recruitment to spawning age (caused by some environmental stochasticity, e.g., due to 
changes in river (or sea) temperature or parasite density in the fjords when the smolt leave the 
river).xiv 
 
Provided that the only unpredictable events affecting the stage return and the stage 
transformation at stage t are those occurring at stage t, and not any earlier (a Markov decision 
process), the maximization problem may be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming 
problem without any additional state variables (Kennedy 1986). As noted by Kennedy (1986), 
the optimal control path cannot be found by tracking forward from the initial state without 
knowing the exact sequence of the random events. Furthermore, the optimal decision choice 
( )*, 0i i iA A A= =  is the same in the stochastic and deterministic cases as long as ( ) 1tE z =  
(Kennedy 1986). Hence, decisions expected under the stochastic environment assumed here 
are the same as those in the deterministic case. This is easily interpreted into the actual 
problem facing each owner. Since they are unable to predict actual stock size in any given 
year, they base their decision on the expected stock: that is, the average stock size. This may 
be referred to as the ‘rule of thumb management’, which actually take place in these kinds of 
recreational fisheries.xv  
 
Let ( )irpπ  denote the profit to owner i when survival is stochastic and the permit price 
decision is rigid, and let ( )ifpπ  denote the profit when the permit price decision is flexible. 
For the chicken game structure to hold, 0, , ,0 0,0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A A A Ai i i iπ π π π> > >  must occur for both 
rigid and flexible permit prices. Furthermore, we let m(rp) and m(fp) denote the mixed 
strategy equilibrium levels under rigid and flexible prices, respectively. Hence, analogous to 
the discussion for equation (6), and provided the chicken game structure holds, the mixed 
equilibrium levels are characterized by: 
 
 
                        
0, , 0, ,
1 1 1 1
,0 0,0 ,0 0,0
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
A A A A A A
A A
rp rpm rp m if
rp rp
π − π π − π> <π − π π − π                                          (7) 
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and 
                        
0, , 0, ,
1 1 1 1
,0 0,0 ,0 0,0
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
A A A A A A
A A
fp fpm fp m if
fp fp
π − π π − π> <π − π π − π                                           (8) 
 
In the next section, the relationship between m, m(rp), and m(fp) is analysed under the 
empirical specifications given below and in Appendix A.  
 
Numerical specifications and results 
The parameter values are reported in Appendix A. Biological and economic data are in 
accordance with a typical large Atlantic salmon river in Norway. A biological investigation 
conducted by Hvidsten et al. (2004) provides the only data available worldwide that estimates 
the recruitment function in a large Atlantic salmon river, more exactly, the river Orkla some 
40 kilometres west of Trondheim. They find that the recruitment function (.)R  is close to the 
Beverton Holt type, but that neither the Cushing nor the Ricker type recruitment can be ruled 
out. It is therefore convenient to write it as the Sheperd (1982) recruitment functionxvi:  
                                                     (.)
1
srSR
S
K
γ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞+⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,                                                           (9) 
 
Where s is the deterministic survival of recruits, r is the maximum recruits per spawning 
salmon, and K is the stock level where density dependent mortality factors start to dominate 
stock independent factors.xvii Finally, the compensation parameter γ is the degree to which 
density-independent effects compensate for changes in stock size. We assume for simplicity 
that the random ecology variable, z , takes only two values: 0.6 and 1.4, and hence the mean 
value is equal to 1 and corresponds to the deterministic ecology in Hvidsten et al (2004). In 
Hvidsten, Fiske and Johnsen (2004), the estimated standard deviation for the Trondheim fjord 
salmon stock is even higher (0.45), but are based on very rough estimates for the period 1997-
2003 (except 2002) according to the authors. As already mentioned, the most straightforward 
interpretation of the stochastic component is that the survival of recruits from spawning to 
mature age is stochastic, and hence that the stochastic survival rate is 0.07 and 0.03 in good 
and bad years respectively, such that the expected survival rate is consistent with the 
deterministic rate of 0.05 and zs replaces s in equation (9)xviii.  
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The inverse demand function for recreational fishing permits reads 
 
                                           ( , ) (1 ( ))P D X q h A X D= α − −β .                                              (10) 
 
The choke price α gives the maximum willingness to pay when the quality-translated catch is 
one fish per day, whereas β reflects the price response in a standard manner. The demand 
function is linear in number of permits while a stock increase shifts demand up through catch 
per day (see e.g. Skonhoft and Logstein 2003). The cost function is specified as 
( )C D C cD= + , where C  and c  are the fixed and the marginal costs of providing fishing 
permits, respectively. In addition the acquisition cost function is specified as ( )G A G gA= +  
where G and g  are the fixed and marginal costs of buying up marine fishing rights 
respectively. The calibration of the model is discussed in Appendix A since the parameter 
values are crucial for the motivation of the chicken structure of the game. With specific 
functional forms, the present version of equation (4) is written 
 
[ ]
1 2
(1 ( ))
(1 ( ))(1 ) ( * )
(1 ( ))(1 )1
t t t t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t
H q h A X D D C cD G gA
sr h A qD X w A w A A
h A qD X
K
κ
+κ γ
= α − −β − − − −
− −+ ψ λ + + −⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                        (11) 
 
Since the time lag in recruitment is 5 years, the stock dynamics is given by a fifth order 
differential equation, and hence no analytical solutions are obtainablexix. However, running 
numerical simulations by applying the Excel Solver is straightforward. The profit of the river 
owners are maximized over the planning period given the stock dynamics and with 
restrictions on possible acquisition levels and permit price flexibility. The results presented in 
Tables 1-4 are based on 100 iterations over a 20 year planning period. However, the results 
are not sensitive to longer planning horizons. Stochastic survival is added by the random 
number generatorxx. The mean values are reported in the tables below, and in the stochastic 
case the average bad and good year results are reported as well (inside brackets). 
 
Deterministic ecology, rigid prices 
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The pay-off matrix in the deterministic environment is reported in Table 1, and shows that the 
expected return on acquisitions is strictly dependent on the choice of the other river owner. 
Since the owners and rivers are identical, a full bi-matrix with the results of both owners is 
superfluous: the results in river 2 are identical to the results in Table 1 in the upper-left and 
lower-right cell. Furthermore, if river owner 1 yields the results in the upper-right cell, e.g., 
0,
1 3266
Aπ =  (in 1000 NOK), the numbers in the lower-left cell represent the results in river 2, 
in that ,02 1709
Aπ = , and vice versa. Hence, the overall river owner profit in the two Nash 
equilibrium outcomes is NOK 4975. Note that the overall river owner profit in the two rivers 
taken together is highest in the case where both owners buy fishing rights (NOK 
2692*2=5384). 
 
The fishing permit price in river 1 increases (NOK 0.280→ NOK 0.400) due to the increased 
demand accompanying the increasing stock entering the river if owner 1 plays 1 *A .
xxi Total 
fish stocks are more or less the same while the fishing effort in the river increases as a result 
of more fish entering the river. The explanation is that an increasing fishing effort in the river 
dampens the direct stock effect following the acquisition. Note that when river owner 1 is a 
successful free rider, his permit price does not increase (Table 1, upper-right cell). This is 
because each owner bases his permit price on his own acquisition decision, as described in 
above (this assumption is relaxed below). Although these results support the chicken game 
structure, they are of course sensitive to the baseline values reported in Appendix A. 
Generally, an increasing willingness to pay for fishing licenses and/or decreasing acquisition 
costs strengthens the chicken game pay-off structure. On the other hand, a decreasing 
willingness to pay for fishing permits and increasing acquisition costs pulls in the direction of 
a prisoner’s dilemma-type pay-off structure.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Stochastic ecology, rigid prices 
As previously discussed, when the ecology is stochastic, river owners do not have reliable 
indications of stock sizes before the fishing season starts. By rigid prices, we mean that 
owners do not adjust permit prices during the fishing season. Acquisition and price decisions 
are taken under anticipation that survival takes on average values. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In this case, the expected returns facing river owners change from the deterministic case, as 
shown in Table 2. It is likely that owners face a lower pay-off from any outcome other than in 
the deterministic case as they will generally set the wrong permit price because of stochastic 
survival. Note that in years with low salmon abundance, acquisitions yield a loss, even if both 
owners play *i iA A= . In addition, the relative expected outcomes of playing 0iA =  and 
*i iA A=  are generally altered. This is illustrated by inserting the profit values reported in 
Tables 1 and 2 into equation (6). Recollect that m and m(rp) denote the mixed strategy 
threshold values with rigid prices in the deterministic and stochastic cases, respectively 
(Tables 1 and 2). We find that free rider incentives are strengthened in the stochastic case 
because 0.09m =  while ( )m rp  is not defined. This is due to the pay-off structure of the game 
being turned into the prisoner’s dilemma; hence, the pure strategy 0iA =  strictly dominates 
*i iA A= .xxii As a result, in the stochastic case, we have a new Nash-equilibrium, 
0 ( 1 2)iA i= = ∧ , with finite repetitions and * ( 1 2)i iA A i= = ∧  in the infinitely repeated 
game according to the standard prisoner’s dilemma theory (for example, see Gibbons 1992). 
The yearly river owner surplus increases substantially in the ‘cooperative’ * ( 1 2)i iA A i= = ∧  
solution compared with the 0 ( 1 2)iA i= = ∧  situation. Note also that the average stock size 
and price of permits, and hence the number of permits, are quite similar under deterministic 
and stochastic survival. However, in the stochastic case, permit prices are generally incorrect 
because they are based on the expected stock level. Thus, in a year with low salmon stock, the 
permit price based on the average stock size is too high, and the demand is reduced below that 
which is optimal. In the same manner, in a year with high salmon stock, the price is below its 
potential. Consequently, due to the fact that permit prices will be generally wrong, the losses 
connected to acquisitions when survival is low are substantial, and vice versa: the gains when 
survival is high are below their potential. This will be demonstrated in Table 4.  
 
Flexible prices 
In this sub-section, we assume that the permit price decision is taken during the fishing 
season, just after the river owner observes the salmon stock in the rivers: that is, just after it is 
possible to observe if it is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ year with respect to survival. As mentioned 
above, in order to compare the deterministic and stochastic case, we recalculate the 
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deterministic outcome for a free rider under the assumption that they are able to adjust the 
permit price according to actual salmon stock. Hence, the free rider is able to adjust the permit 
price if he observes a large salmon stock due to an acquisition by the other river owner. The 
new deterministic pay-off matrix is presented in Table 3, and the results for the stochastic 
case are given in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Note first that under deterministic conditions, the only difference from the rigid price setting 
in Table 1 is in the upper-right cell. This shows that the gain from successful free-riding in the 
Nash-equilibrium is higher (NOK 3675 versus NOK 3266) when the permit price decision is 
made flexible. Inserting from Table 3 into equation (6), we find that the new mixed strategy 
threshold level under deterministic ecology and flexible permit prices is 0.05m =  (as opposed 
to 0.09m =  with rigid prices). This means that the incentive to free ride is higher than under 
sticky prices in the deterministic case. On the other hand, in this case the stochastic ecology of 
salmon pulls the free-riding incentives in the other direction. This is seen by calculating the 
mixed strategy threshold level under stochastic ecology and flexible permit prices, which 
yield ( ) 0.27m fp =  (inserted in equation (6) from Table 4). The reasoning is straightforward 
as the losses from acquisitions in years with low survival rates are reduced, and the gains in 
good years are increased. This is only partly counterbalanced by the increased gain from a 
successful free rider strategy.  
 
 
Discussion and some concluding remarks 
The acquisition question considered in this paper analyses Coasian mechanisms and a 
potential reason as to why Coasian solutions often seem hard to achieve in cases of natural 
resource management. We demonstrate that the stochastic ecology of wild Atlantic salmon 
may explain the lack of side payment agreements in Norwegian fjords. In a game apparently 
described as having a chicken game pay-off structure, the game may in reality be of the 
prisoner’s dilemma type when stochastic ecology is taken into account. Moreover, we find 
that if the river owners take stochastic ecology into account, the way they set permit prices is 
crucial for acquisition decisions. As previously mentioned, the ‘as if myopically omniscient’ 
regulator benchmark in Weitzman (2002) coincides with our flexible price setting regime. By 
combining the rigid versus flexible price setting aspect with strategic interactions, we gain 
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additional insights. Rigidities characterizing the permit price decision today may explain why 
river owners are reluctant to buy fishing rights by strengthening the incentive to free ride. 
With rigid prices and stochastic survival, the owners earn less when survival is high, and may 
even face potential losses when survival is low.  
 
The model presented here may seem restrictive in its assumptions, e.g., with only two 
homogenous river owners. On the other hand, the gain is that we could focus solely on how 
stochastic ecology affects strategic interactions. Thus, we could neglect other potential and 
previously more extensively studied reasons as to why Coasian solutions may not arise, such 
as transaction costs, many agents, and so forth. In addition, from this simple set up it is easy 
to see when these restrictions are crucial for results, when they are not, and what economic 
driving forces determine the structure of the game. As previously mentioned, if there are more 
than two rivers (or owners), the same type of game structure may be achieved as long as each 
owner is large enough to benefit, even if they must bear the costs of acquisitions on their 
own.xxiii We may also translate the model into terms of two groups of rivers, where the Nash 
equilibrium is characterized by a group of rivers that pay for acquisitions and a group that do 
not. Moreover, if the two rivers (or groups of rivers) considered are heterogeneous, e.g., with 
respect to river size and salmon stock abundance, the same type of argument holds. The 
crucial point is that each river owner may benefit, even if they bear the costs of acquisitions 
on their own. Generally, the larger the stock in river 2 is relative to the stock in river 1, the 
more likely free-riding in river 1 will occur since the cost of acquisitions increases, and vice 
versa: smaller stock size in river 2 makes acquisition payments in river 1 more likely.  
 
The present analysis sheds some light over other situations in which different agents utilize 
the same ecological resource, and where seemingly obvious gains from side payment regimes 
appear to be neglected. For example, this is often the case where one harvesting agent is more 
cost efficient than another. However, in spite of all the potential side payment solutions in 
natural resource management, few examples of such arrangements exist. The influence of 
stochastic ecology on the strategic management decisions analysed here is one of the factors 
that may help explain why such Coasian outcomes are rarely seen.  
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Table 1. Deterministic ecology. Pay off matrix for river owner 1, given the simultaneously 
taken acquisition decision by the other river owner. iA  is acquisition of fishing rights by river 
owner i (i=1,2), 1π  is the profit in river 1 (in NOK 1000), 1P  is the fishing permit price in 
river 1 (in NOK 1000),  1X  is the salmon stock level in river 1 (in 1000  salmon), 1D  is the 
number of number of fishing permits  (in 1000 fishing permits), A1 is acquisition level (in 
1000  salmon).   
 
 A2=0 A2=A* 
 
A1=0 
Π1=1656 
P1=0.280 
X1=15.6 
D1=7.2 
Π1=3266 
P1=0.280 
X1=15.7 
D1=14.2 
 
A1=A* 
Π1=1709 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.9 
D1=10.5 
A1=9.5 
Π1=2692 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.9 
D1=10.5 
A1=4.8 
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Table 2.  Stochastic ecology: Rigid permit price. Pay off matrix for river owner 1, given the 
simultaneously taken acquisition decision by the other river owner.  Results in average values 
when survival is 0.03 and 0.07 with uniform distribution:  Values inside brackets indicate 
average values with survival equal to 0.03 and 0.07 respectively.  iA  is acquisition of fishing 
rights by river owner i (i=1,2), 1π  is the profit in river 1 (in NOK 1000), 1P  is the fishing 
permit price in river 1 (in NOK 1000),  1X  is the salmon stock level in river 1 (in 1000  
salmon), 1D  is the number of number of fishing permits  (in 1000 fishing permits), A1 is 
acquisition level (in 1000  salmon).   
 
 
 A2=0 A2=A* 
 
 
A1=0 
 
Π1=1576 [138,3013] 
P1=0.280 
X1=15.4 [9.5, 21.3] 
D1=7.0 [0.6,13.1] 
 
Π1=3051 [1173, 5014] 
P1=0.280 
X1=15.2 [9.6, 20.7] 
D1=13.5 [5.1, 21.8] 
 
 
A1=A* 
 
Π1=1307 [-1546, 4159] 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.1 [9.7, 20.6] 
D1=10.0 [1.2,17.5] 
A1=9.1 [5.8, 12.4] 
 
Π1=2290 [-563, 5142] 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.1 [9.7, 20.6] 
D1=10.0 [1.2, 17.5] 
A1=4.5 [2.9, 6.2] 
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Table 3. Deterministic ecology: Flexible permit price. Pay off matrix for river owner 1, given 
the simultaneously taken acquisition decision by the other river owner. iA  is acquisition of 
fishing rights by river owner i (i=1,2), 1π  is the profit in river 1 (in NOK 1000), 1P  is the 
fishing permit price in river 1 (in NOK 1000),  1X  is the salmon stock level in river 1 (in 1000  
salmon), 1D  is the number of number of fishing permits  (in 1000 fishing permits), A1 is 
acquisition level (in 1000  salmon).   
 
 
 A2=0 A2=A* 
 
A1=0 
Π1=1656 
P1=0.280 
X1=15.6 
D1=7.2 
Π1=3675 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.9 
D1=10.5 
 
A1=A* 
Π1=1709 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.9 
D1=10.5 
A1=9.5 
Π1=2692 
P1=0.400 
X1=15.9 
D1=10.5 
A1=4.8 
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Table 4.  Stochastic ecology:  Flexible permit price. Pay off matrix for river owner 1, given 
the simultaneously taken acquisition decision by the other river owner. Results in average 
values when survival is 0.03 and 0.07 with uniform distribution. Values inside brackets 
indicate average values with survival equal to 0.03 and 0.07 respectively. iA  is acquisition of 
fishing rights by river owner i (i=1,2), 1π  is the profit in river 1 (in NOK 1000), 1P  is the 
fishing permit price in river 1 (in NOK 1000),  1X  is the salmon stock level in river 1 (in 1000  
salmon), 1D  is the number of number of fishing permits  (in 1000 fishing permits), A1 is 
acquisition level (in 1000  salmon).   
 
 
 A2=0 A2=A* 
 
 
A1=0 
 
Π1=1924 [516, 3332] 
P1=0.280 [0.170, 0.390]
X1=15.6 [9.5, 21.7] 
D1=7.1 [4.3, 9.8] 
 
Π1=4255 [1216, 7293] 
P1=0.400 [0.240, 0.560] 
X1=15.8 [9.6, 22.0] 
D1=10.4 [6.4, 14.3] 
 
 
A1=A* 
 
Π1=2289 [-750, 5327] 
P1=0.400 [0.240, 0.560]
X1=15.8 [9.6, 22.0] 
D1=10.4 [6.4, 14.3] 
A1=9.5 [5.8, 13.2] 
 
Π1=3272 [233,6310] 
P1=0.400 [0.240, 0.560] 
X1=15.8 [9.6, 22.0] 
D1=10.4 [6.5, 14.3] 
A1=4.7 [2.9, 6.6] 
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Figure 1. Marine and recreational harvest. 
The direction of the spawning run of salmon is indicated by arrows. Spawning takes place in 
the rivers in the late autumn after the fishing season closes.  
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Figure 2. Harvest and reproduction 
t is time subscript, X is stock size, h is marine and y is river harvest rate, S is spawning stock, R the recruitement 
function, and κ is the time lag in recruitment.    
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Appendix A: parameter values  
The parameter definitions, values, and sources are presented in table A1. As mentioned, the 
ecological values are based on the Orkla survey by Hvidsten et al (2004). The economic 
values are calibrated to fit with a typical large Atlantic salmon river such as Orkla. Hence, 
willingness to pay fits both with survey (postal CV) results in Aas, Birkelund, and Thrane 
(2000) and Olaussen (2005) as well as with the actual fishing permits prices in the river Orkla. 
Moreover, the number of fishing permits and the recreational harvest rate fits with the actual 
situation in the river Orkla.  
 
The crucial question for the chicken game structure to hold is: How much does the 
willingness to pay among anglers increase if the available salmon stock in the river increases? 
In Olaussen (2005), Norwegian salmon anglers were asked how much their willingness to pay 
per daily fishing permit increased if the available stock in the rivers increased by 30%, which 
is in accordance with the average stock increase in the river due to A=A* (no marine harvest). 
The reported average increase in the willingness to pay was NOK 0.120 per fishing permit 
(n=231), which is in accordance with the results presented supporting the chicken game pay 
off structure (the permit price increases from NOK 0.280 to NOK 0.400 per fishing permit).  
 
Another crucial factor is the acquisition costs. The values in Table A1 are in accordance with 
the costs of acquisitions in 2005, where the price per kilo salmon was NOK 0.07 per kilo 
according to ErT (2005). The baseline fixed cost of acquisitions (transaction costs) is set equal 
to zero. Sensitivity analyses show that in the two deterministic cases, the pay off structure 
changes to the Prisoners dilemma type whenG >NOK 53, while it takes NOK 365 in the 
stochastic case with flexible permit prices. All parameters are defined and the baseline values 
are summarized in Table A1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
Table A1: Baseline values prices and costs, ecological and other parameters.  
Parameter Parameter description Value Reference/Source 
r Maximum recruitment per spawning salmon 270 (smolt per 
spawning salmon) 
Hvidsten et al. 
(2004) 
γ Decides to which extent density independent factors 
compensates for stock changes 
0.00106 Hvidsten et al. 
(2004) 
K 
 
Stock level where density dependent mortality 
dominates density independent factors 
1489 (number of 
spawning salmon) 
Hvidsten et al. 
(2004) 
s Deterministic survival rate recruits 0.05 Hvidsten et al. 
(2004) 
α Reservation price when catch per day is 1 1.500 
(1000NOK/salmon) 
Olaussen 
(2005)/calibrated 
β Price effect demand 0.00003 
(1000NOK/day2) 
Olaussen (2005)/ 
calibrated 
c Marginal cost fishing permit sale 0.05 
(1000NOK/day) 
calibrated 
C Fixed cost fishing permit sale 0 Birkelund, Lein, 
and Aas (2000)/ 
calibrated 
q Catchability coefficient 0.00003 (1/day) Fiske and Aas 
(2001) 
h Marine harvest rate 0.3 NOU (1999:9) 
Hvidsten, Fiske, 
and Johnsen (2004) 
κ Time lag recruitment  5 years NOU (1999:9) 
Hvidsten, Fiske, 
and Johnsen (2004) 
g Marginal cost of acquisition 0.07 (NOK/Kg) ErT (2005) 
G Fixed cost acquisition agreement.  0  ErT (2005) 
 
z 
 
Stochastic ecology parameter 
 
u.d: (0.6, 1.4) 
 
Hvidsten, Fiske 
and Johnsen 
(2004a) 
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Appendix B: 
 
Given the outputs in the pay off matrix above, the owner in river 1 hence maximises (see e.g. 
Varian 1992) 
 
1 1
0,0 0, ,0 ,
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( *), (0)
max (0) (0) ( *) ( *) (0) ( *)A A A A
A
A A A
ρ ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ρ ρ π +ρ π +ρ ρ π +ρ π⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
s.t. 1 1(0) ( *) 1Aρ + ρ = , 2 2(0) ( *) 1Aρ + ρ = , 1(0) 0ρ ≥ , 1( *) 0Aρ ≥ , and 2 (0) 0ρ ≥ , 2 ( *) 0Aρ ≥ . 
 
The Lagrangian takes the form 
[ ]
1 1
0,0 0, ,0 ,
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2( *), (0)
1 1 0 1 1
(0) (0) (0) ( *) ( *) (0) ( *) ( *)
(0) ( *) 1 (0) ( *)
A A A A
A
A
L A A A A
A A
ρ ρ = π ρ ρ + π ρ ρ + π ρ ρ + π ρ ρ −
λ ρ + ρ − −μ ρ −μ ρ
 
where λ , 0μ  and Aμ  are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the constraints.  Differentiating 
with respect to 1(0)ρ and 1( *)Aρ gives the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for river owner 1 as 
0,0 0,
1 2 1 2 0(0) ( *) 0
A Aπ ρ + π ρ − λ −μ =  and ,0 ,1 2 1 2(0) ( *) 0A A A AAπ ρ + π ρ − λ −μ = . 
 
We only consider the mixed strategies where 1(0) 0ρ >  and 1( *) 0Aρ > since the pure strategy 
solutions 1 0A =  and 1 1 *A A= are easily recognised, and hence the complementary slackness 
condition implies that 0 0Aμ μ= = . Recollecting that 2 2(0) ( *) 1Aρ + ρ = , we may solve 
for 2 ( *)Aρ , and by following the same procedure for river owner 2 we find 1( *).Aρ  Owner i`s 
best-response correspondence is dependent on what he believes the other owner will do. Since 
we have that 2 2(0) 1 ( *)Aρ = −ρ , owner 1`s expected pay off by playing 1 0A = and 1 1 *A A=  is 
0,0 0,0 0,
1 2 1 2 1( *) ( *)
AA Aπ ρ π ρ π− +  and ,0 ,0 ,1 2 1 2 1( *) ( *)A A A AA Aπ ρ π ρ π− +  respectively. Hence, 
owner 1 is indifferent between these two strategies if 
0,0 0,0 0, ,0 ,0 ,
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( *) ( *) ( *) ( *)
A A A A AA A A Aπ ρ π ρ π π ρ π ρ π− + = − + , and solving for 2 ( *)Aρ  
yields ( ) ,0 0,01 12 ,0 0,0 0, ,
1 1 1 1
*
A
A A A AA m
π − πρ = =π − π + π − π (equation (2) in main text).  
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i The expenditures were shared by Norway (55%), England (22%), Ireland (17%), and Iceland (6%) based on the 
composition of the Faeroe Islands catch.  
ii More than one-third of Atlantic salmon stock spawns in Norwegian rivers. The remaining stock is distributed 
across a number of countries, including Scotland, England, Wales, Ireland, Iceland, Russia, Sweden, Finland, 
Canada, and the US (F1999).  
iii Note that this is, in effect, the same as the ‘as if myopically omniscient’ regulator case, which serves as a 
benchmark in Weitzman (2002). 
iv This is regulated by law (lov om laksefisk og innlandsfisk §25); however, exceptions are given for small rivers. 
v See Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) and Li (1998) for examples of expositions of sharing rules in fisheries.  
vi Note that this result owes to the specification of the Schaefer type harvest function. A more general 
specification, e.g. [ ] 211 1 1(1 ) aaY qD h X= − yields [ ] 2 111 1(1 ) aay qD h X −= − , and where a2=1 reduces to 11 1ay qD= , 
and a1=a2=1 reduces to the result in the main text. 
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vii We hence have a delay-difference recruitment model as in Clark (1976). See also Bjørndal (1988, 1990). The 
average lag time for salmon, κ , is 5 years (Hvidsten et al. (2004)). 
viii As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, monopolistic competition between river owners may occur. One 
straightforward interpretation of the somewhat stylized monopolistic assumption is that we consider the case 
where anglers do not switch between rivers due to a long distance between them. Moreover, the assumption is 
also justified by a study by Birkelund, Lein, and Aas (2000). They asked river owners if they would change their 
permit price if other river owners changed their price. On average 58% would leave their own price unchanged, 
24% would change their price while the remaining 18% were uncertain. See also Olaussen and Skonhoft (2005) 
for an analysis of various management regimes in Atlantic salmon rivers. 
ix Technically, a river owner choosing *iA  simply indicates that the first order condition with respect to A 
gives 0 *AH when A A≥ = . 
x Note that the manager determines the permit price instead of the number of permits. However, this is merely a 
matter of exposition. Thus, the permit price is the inverse of the demand function, and the effect is exactly the 
same.  
xi Note that since m is a probability, it is only defined for 0m ≥ . Thus, in e.g., a pay-off scheme such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma, it is not defined, simply because the only Nash equilibrium is the ( )0 1 2iA i= = ∧  
solution. 
xii See also Carlsen (1994) for an analysis of reputation manipulation in a sponsor-bureau framework where both 
players apply mixed strategies. 
xiii Note that this is the same condition under which fees are set by the management authority in Weitzman 
(2002).  
xiv Hence, we only consider environmental stochasticity and neglect demographic stochasticity. This is a valid 
simplification as long as populations are dense because the environmental stochasticity will dominate in large 
populations (for example, see Lande, Engen, and Saether 2003). 
xv Recollect, for example, that the acquisition quantity is also based on average yearly catch statistics over the 
five previous fishing seasons.  
xvi The Shepherd function produces the Cushing recruitment function when γ<1, the Beverton Holt recruitment 
function when γ=1, and the Ricker recruitment function when γ>1. 
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xvii Note that the numbers reported in Hvidsten et al. (2004) are measured as recruits per egg per square metre. 
However, we have translated them into the corresponding number of recruits per spawning salmon in the river 
(available on request). 
xviii Note that this is the same type of stochasticity (good and bad years) as considered by Mckelvey (1997), only 
he formulated the underlying stock uncertainty (good and bad seasons) directly in terms of profit in the model.  
xix However, the equilibrium stock and effort levels are quite straightforward to derive, even though the 
expressions are quite messy (available on author’s request). 
xx Excel files available on author’s request. 
xxi Acquisitions increase salmon stock, and the salmon stock shifts demand up due to an increased catch per day, 
as explained in above.  
xxii Note also that equations (7) and (8) only hold under the chicken game pay-off structure (see also footnote 
xiii). 
xxiii By the same structure, we mean that *A A=  is the optimal choice if the other players choose 0A = . 
However, the chicken game notion is restricted to games with two players and symmetric pay-off schemes.  
